57. 項目本身就有很多資源。算上所有的承包商和設(shè)備開發(fā)商,大概有5到10個系統(tǒng)工程師。這就是強大的攻關(guān)資源。
Rule #58: Many managers, just because they have the scientists under contract on their project, forget that the scientists are their customers and many times have easier access to top management than the managers do. 58. 正是因為項目合同中有專家們的參與,許多經(jīng)理就忘記了這些專家們的客戶身份,很多時候他們比經(jīng)理們更容易接近高層。Rule
#59: Most scientists are rational unless you endanger their chance to do their experiment. They will work with you if they believe you are telling them the truth. This includes reducing their own plans. 59. 大多數(shù)專家都是理性的,除非你危及到他們的實驗。如果他們相信你所說的話,他們就會與你合作,包括削減他們自己的計劃。
Hardware Rule
#60: In the space business, there is no such thing as previously flown hardware. The people who build the next unit probably never saw the previous unit. There are probably minor changes (perhaps even major changes); the operational environment has probably changed; the people who check the unit out in most cases will not understand the unit or the test equipment. 60 在航天領(lǐng)域,與制造以往飛行器不同的是,制造下一個部件的人永遠(yuǎn)也看不到前一個部件的樣子。兩個部件可能相差無幾(也可能截然不同);操作環(huán)境也有可能發(fā)生變化;負(fù)責(zé)檢驗的人員大多數(shù)時候都不了解他們要檢驗的部件或者檢驗用的設(shè)備。
Rule #61: Most equipment works as built, not as the designer planned. This is due to layout of the design, poor understanding on the designer s part, or poor understanding of component specifications.
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文章來源:中國項目管理資源網(wǎng)
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